


AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

**Exploring Anthropology's Value to Military Strategy Since 2000**



A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

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### **Disclaimer**

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Anthropology evolved alongside colonial militaries. The expertise of anthropologists was utilized to ensure the success of military members charged to implement the strategy of colonial expansion. Since World War II, however, the profession of anthropology in America has engaged in a debate about the ethics of this traditional role of anthropologists. The cooperative role between anthropology and the military reached its lowest point after several unfortunate incidents in the 1960s that continue to haunt every proposal of cooperation to this day. As the US took action after the calamity of September 11, 2001, military experts began to understand that their scope of responsibility had expanded into territory best understood with cultural insight. This fed into the military requesting anthropologist's expertise, and anthropologists have provided assistance. Military use of anthropologists in Afghanistan and Iraq has helped improve military effectiveness in environments where military members work with locals for training and security, but it promises to be most effective by creating culturally competent military members before they deploy. An analysis of military doctrine since 2000 demonstrates how the military has used the advice it received to change its tactics to meet the needs of tasks beyond traditional open conflict. Analyzing some elements of the debate among anthropologists will demonstrate the pushback against military anthropology programs, and introduce anthropology's code of ethics. Reviewing the purpose, ethics, and effectiveness of military anthropology will highlight the military imperative of becoming cross-culturally competent.

### **Introduction**

On 19 March, 2003, forces from the United States began Operation Iraqi Freedom and invaded Iraq in a drive to the capital which was captured on 9 April. On 16 May, L. Paul Bremmer, the Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority, (CPA) issued CPA Order Number 1 that dissolved the Ba'ath Party, and on 23 May, CPA Number 2 dissolved the

strongest Iraqi Ministries along with the entire Iraqi military.<sup>1</sup> The CPA assumed the state would naturally fill the void with another, equally strong centralized state institution. However, as the CPA peeled back the centralizing institutions of Iraq, instead of a core of institutionalized nation-state sentiment, the CPA found a system of tribes vying for control.

Both the military and other advisory organizations foretold of this inevitability but failed to convincingly deliver the message before the CPA undermined the last vestiges of centralized control in Iraq. Ultimately, the failure to understand the interplay between nation-state sovereignty, tribe and nations led to disastrous administrative actions. The effect of the power struggle was almost immediate; by 25 June, the British Special Representative for Iraq, John Sawers, cabled that Paul Bremmer had twice solicited President George W. Bush for more forces to better police Baghdad.<sup>2</sup> Traditional social institutional power rebalancing had begun to tear the Iraqi state apart. Administrative and tactical missteps in Iraq, such as the errors made by the CPA, have contributed to doctrinal changes and an increased focus on cultural in all aspects of the military's employment.<sup>3</sup>

### **Tracing the Growth of Military Cultural Awareness through Analysis of Doctrine**

The role of the US military has expanded since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War of 1991. The military has been the most capable and resourced organization that US leadership can employ to meet the needs of foreign policy around the world. The military has had to expand its repertoire of capabilities according to new mission sets. In the case of policing actions in the Balkans in the mid and late 1990s, the military expanded its strategy to include military operations other than war, (MOOTW). This mission set expected military force to police and maintain security to prevent further bloodshed by indigenous groups instead of fighting conflicts on battlefields. After the initial kinetic actions in Afghanistan in 2001 and less than two

years later, in Iraq, the military was forced to reevaluate its doctrine again to expand to accommodate new strategic requirements. No longer were the tasks identified through the lessons learned in the Balkans enough; the military had an even deeper problem at hand. Military academics drew from history and went to modern experts to create counterinsurgency doctrine. This effort relied on a foundational understanding of the culture of the land being occupied. Analysis of doctrine will show how changes have been made based on new mission sets.

During a military action, the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE) is the institutionalized process of enemy analysis and study of the adversary perspective. Doctrinally, the team that conducts JIPOE goes on to advise the planners, but also forms the Red Cell who plays the adversary during plans war-gaming. It is, therefore, essential that JIPOE members thoroughly understand the adversary's perspective. Doctrinal updates to the parent regulation of JIPOE, Joint Publication (JP) 2-01.3, demonstrate how the role of the team has changed to accommodate new perspectives resultant from broader military mission sets. The current version of JP 2-01.3 was published 16 June 2009. Differences between it and its predecessor, published in 2000, highlight how much military strategy has had to change.

The 24 May 2000 version of JIPOE was titled, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace*. It includes detailed analysis for Military Operations Other than War, (MOOTW), which in large part highlighted the unexpected mission set the military was asked to accomplish according to the post-Cold War environment of the 1990s. In policing actions in Haiti, Somalia, and throughout each crisis in the Balkans, the military was asked to wield its might in actions that fell far short of large conventional actions of fielded military forces. The MOOTW chapter of the 2000 version of JIPOE pays little attention

to understanding the culture of the enemy. The section describing enemy cultural considerations spans just over one page, and highlights that “the adversary could be greatly different from the adversary normally associated with wartime operations.”<sup>4</sup> It offers up that the adversary may include “organizations, groups, decision makers, or even physical factors.”<sup>5</sup> JIPOE analysts are directed to “study the psychology of all key decision makers... know the adversary’s doctrine... identify all factions involved in the operation... identify the root causes that influence the situation... identify HVTs [High Value Targets] in the operational area.”<sup>6</sup> These curt directions summarize very broad activities that the military would begin to more deeply understand during counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Its shortfalls are important to note, because the cultural guidance of MOOTW in this document was the doctrine used by planners when the US invaded Afghanistan and Iraq.

In contrast to JP 2-01.3 from 2000, Joint Publication (JP) 2-01.3 *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment* published 16 June 2009, highlights several of the lessons learned regarding the importance of cultural study and understanding as the military plans for operations. While there is still a minimalist approach to guidance on cultural aspects as elements to planning, there is a section on “developing a systems perspective,” to appreciate the operational environment’s “interconnected or interrelated network, group or chain – a functionally, physically, and/or behaviorally related group of regularly interacting or interdependent elements that forms a unified whole.”<sup>7</sup> Developing a systems perspective is an attempt at trying to determine how an input or change in one part of a system will affect other parts of the system, an essential element to understanding the interrelated aspects of culture. This perspective is meant to be developed using analysis of the adversary’s political, military, economic, social, information and infrastructure elements. It is an improvement over the past

iteration of the JIPOE parent regulation because it acknowledges more depth behind planning against an adversary. This construct infuses the role of culture to ensuring US military success in counterinsurgency.

In addition to encouraging developing a systems perspective, the JIPOE also provides further cultural guidance in chapter 4. The chapter was rewritten from the 2000 version to include bolstered information from the MOOTW chapter, along with a section on countering asymmetric approaches. Chapter four also includes guidance for support during stability operations and irregular warfare. This section includes “increased emphasis on sociocultural factors,” such as “society... social culture... culture... power and authority... and interests.”<sup>8</sup> The pages devoted to developing a better understanding of sociocultural factors provide a depth of details reflective of the lessons learned from US experience in Afghanistan and Iraq. There is also “heavier emphasis on detailed knowledge,”<sup>9</sup> which presents the idea of consolidating all intelligence sources to determine a detailed understanding of how the society functions at all levels. Finally, analysis includes “increased need for collaboration and information sharing,”<sup>10</sup> whereby JIPOE members are to rely on outside agencies from other nations as well as non-governmental organizations and private companies to gather the most detailed knowledge and pertinent information. Overall, the changes in the parent doctrine for the JIPOE show an increased emphasis on cultural study and detailed sociocultural knowledge of the adversary in the operational environment commensurate with the latest strategic priorities of the military. These changes illustrate a shift in military culture influenced by revisions to counterinsurgency doctrine.

Joint Publication (JP) 3-24 *Counterinsurgency* published 22 November 2013, is the joint revision of the US Army’s Field Manual 3-24 doctrine of the same name published 15

December, 2006. The revisions incorporated in JP 3-24 that deal with cultural understanding are largely semantic in nature, and therefore reflect that apart from organization of military forces, little has changed based on US experience in Afghanistan and Iraq since 2006. Because the two documents are so similar for this analysis, I will refer to them as counterinsurgency doctrine. The army field manual set forth a doctrinal approach to the military's role in counterinsurgency operations that has been relatively effective for the last eight years. This is noteworthy, because as FM 3-24 acknowledges in its opening pages, it was the first revision of counterinsurgency doctrine in at least 20 years.<sup>11</sup> Behind this success was the composite effort in its creation.

General David Petraeus organized a very public rewriting and peer review process of counterinsurgency doctrine before he released it to the public for popular consumption. He did this as part of a campaign to change strategy in Operation Iraqi Freedom.<sup>12</sup> Included in his review panel were social science and doctrine experts. Their input into its creation and review helped ensure its applicability to the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. It directs that during JIPOE for counterinsurgency operations the enemy should be modeled and understood "with an emphasis on sociocultural and civil factors."<sup>13</sup> It also directs that host nation representatives should be utilized in the JIPOE process, in order to achieve a better cultural understanding of the environment. This demonstrates a concerted effort to explain and define cultural factors from a perspective of the target society, which reflects an influence of anthropology and a genuine effort to begin to understand culture in new terms. These doctrinal changes since 2000 demonstrate the flexibility of the US military with regard to an increasing scope of responsibility as the most capable government organization faced with implementing expanded US foreign policy. The ability of the military to adapt its doctrine to include cultural awareness reflects the expanse of knowledge in our society, but cultural study experts have a voice in this process as well.



## **Developing an Anthropological Code of Ethics**

Anthropologists have faced a vexing history of complicity with invading and colonial forces since the inception of their profession. Three cases since World War II document the organization's attempt at creating a professional code of conduct to alleviate the collective shame of this complicity. The first is known as Mead's Dilemma. The dilemma was based on a letter that Margaret Mead, a prominent and ultimately controversial anthropologist, wrote in 1942. It detailed her desire to use her observational skills to identify the sources of social problems affecting individuals and groups in the United States as the nation faced involvement in the war, and later to use her skill to aid the US war effort.<sup>14</sup> Her arguments to aid the US against the Germans and the Japanese carried mass appeal to the community, and ultimately the sentiment among anthropologists ensured the US presented well intentioned and educated options to postwar Japan. This dilemma is hailed as one of the first open discussions on the morality of the use of anthropological knowledge of socio-cultural characteristics and domains in the United States. The desire to aid the nation in righteous causes carried the day during World War II, but Margaret Mead assisted the government in other war efforts, such as Vietnam, and therefore lost her community's moral support. The era of Mead's Dilemma presented the last time there was clear agreement over collusion between anthropologists and the military.

'Mead's Dilemma opened the door to discussion about the role of anthropology in the military, and Project Camelot has become a lightning rod that the American Anthropological Association (AAA) has used to air the potential immorality that can result from working with the military. The 1964 proposed Project Camelot is singled out in the 2007 AAA Commission on the Engagement of Anthropology with the US Security and Intelligence Communities report as one of many scandals that "loom enormously in the collective anthropological memory... to attribute

anthropologists' protests to present-day politics, rather than disciplinary history or ethics.”<sup>15</sup> The purpose of the project was to document the rise of insurgencies within governments of a named few South American countries in the 1960s in order to develop a “social systems model which would make it possible to predict and influence politically significant aspects of social change in the developing nations of the world.”<sup>16</sup> The moral objection with the project, therefore, was that teams were to observe the growth of insurgencies in nations at a time before they failed.

The proposal met criticism by an anthropologist who was working in Chile at the time. Among the qualms with the project was the idea of secret study, and unreciprocated information gathering in Latin America for the United States without offering information about the United States to Latin America. Most dooming to the project was its use by an assistant professor, who had been hired as an outside consultant, to schedule a meeting with the vice chancellor of the University of Chile. He allowed the vice chancellor to believe he was a direct official of Project Camelot. Members of the university met the assistant professor with arguments fired by the criticisms of the aforementioned anthropologist, and the project became an issue of open debate in the Chilean Senate. There, all of its flaws were publically aired and it was labeled as US “intervention” and “imperialism.”<sup>17</sup> The project was ultimately dropped without any real study ever having occurred. It still captures the attention of anthropologists today as a glaring example of how participation with the military can lead to potentially immoral acts.

Another case that has driven anthropologists' desire to create a code of ethics is known as the Thailand Affair. The issue is important to the community because it was investigated by a special committee of the AAA and it involved at least one American anthropologist who took part in covert operations and study.<sup>18</sup> Three prominent US government organizations were involved in Southeast Asia studies documenting communist activities, to include what is known

today as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, (DARPA) the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) and the US Agency for International Development (USAID). The research was exposed in 1970 by a student employee of an anthropology professor, but the project was proposed in 1967. Its concept was similar to Camelot in that it proposed to develop “preventive counterinsurgency measures” for Thailand, but also described three types of operations: using tangible benefits to secure “allegiance and political stability,” and the military to “counteract or neutralize success already achieved” by insurgents, as well as preventive measures to preempt or inhibit insurgent success by “assassinating key spokesmen and strengthening retaliatory mechanisms.”<sup>19</sup> The proposal also states that these three operations would benefit by significant contributions to their design by social scientists.<sup>20</sup>

The Thailand Affair thus demonstrates the true ethical dilemma faced by anthropologists who might participate in military projects. If the people they study become targets for offensive military action, trust between the scientist and their study groups would break down, and the community might suffer as a result. Anthropologists have sought to maintain the objectivity of their field by remaining unattached to particular outcomes, and also by maintaining trust by avoiding the perception that their work results in a negative benefit. Ultimately, the debate highlighted by Mead’s Dilemma, Project Camelot, and the Thailand affair led the AAA to establish a code of ethics for anthropologists.

As highlighted by Mead’s Dilemma, the discussion on ethics among anthropologists has been ongoing in the United States since before World War II. Discussions and debates led to statements of ethics, and ultimately to the code of ethics presented today. The latest revision was posted for review online at the AAA blog on 1 November 2012, after an open review and comment period by anyone who may observe the blog. The AAA Code of Ethics is:

1. Do no harm.
2. Be open and honest regarding your work.
3. Obtain informed consent and necessary permissions.
4. Weigh competing ethical obligations and affected parties.
5. Make your results accessible.
6. Protect and preserve your records.
7. Maintain respectful and ethical professional relationships.<sup>21</sup>

The code forms the backdrop to the ethical debate that continues to this day about anthropologists' participation in military activities. An awareness of the elements of the codes not only frames the debate, but also reflects a level of awareness that should also be considered by military planners. In particular, in the realm of MOOTW, stability operations, and counterinsurgency, awareness of relationships and how they are perceived is a cornerstone of establishing trust. Understanding how the military's task is perceived by the local population should shape the military's effort to establish relationships in an operational environment. These efforts should draw from the past experiences of the professional core of anthropologists who have made their mark by establishing and maintaining trust among populations on the fringes of mainstream society.

George R. Lucas, a philosophy Ph.D. offers up three categories of work that can be pursued by anthropologists. The categories were inspired by the 2007 CEAUSSIC report to the AAA which provides some guidance and illustrations for its readers about what roles anthropologists may play and what they should do if ethical conduct is not observed. The three categories break down as Military Anthropology<sub>1</sub> (MA<sub>1</sub>): anthropological study **of** military culture, MA<sub>2</sub>: anthropological study **for** the military, in endeavors such as the Human Terrain System concept, where teams of social scientists are embedded with military units to conduct social analysis on the battlefield, and finally, MA<sub>3</sub>: anthropological study **for** the military, in the areas of educational programs such as language, culture and regional studies at military schools

of higher learning.<sup>22</sup> The three categories are broad enough to encompass all theoretical purposes that anthropologists as members of the community of social sciences could be used to serve in military operations. The AAA has hosted the debate about anthropological participation in each of these three areas, and as in any theoretical debate, there are outliers that have hard opinions on each extreme end. The remainder of this paper will focus on an analysis of the anthropological contribution to each category, and offer up reasons to understand the AAA perspective. With this information, the military can realize what sort of programs it should emphasize in order to best accomplish the strategic tasks it is charged with in the name of US interests.

### **The Programs of Military Anthropology**

The AAA has judged MA<sub>2</sub> as the least ethical category of military anthropology by means of its code of ethics, CEAUSSIC reports, and open debates on its blog. The lightning rod system most associated with MA<sub>2</sub> is the Human Terrain Team, (HTT) employed under the Human Terrain System (HTS) concept of the military. Human Terrain Teams suffer from their close association with military operations. They are embedded with and protected by military units that engage in military activities during combat operations. Initially, the teams were meant to include anthropologists, but the requirements have morphed along with the concept over time, and today most members of HTS are social scientists, with very few being anthropologists. HTTs have been used in areas to gather socio-cultural data for military commanders, and often have their greatest impact in their ability to council military commanders on local social issues and concerns.<sup>23</sup> HTS arose out of the same movement that inspired the updates to FM 3-24 and JP 2-01.03. Members of the military felt their plans did not include key aspects of socio-cultural factors or understanding to get the results they needed in the new kind of fight they were in. While the military quickly found a use for HTS, critics voiced their concerns equally as fast.

As recently as 25 April 2012, the AAA has publically spoken out against HTS in Afghanistan.<sup>24</sup> Elements of criticism of the program are based on collecting information that may be shared only with the US military or otherwise classified, and which may put cooperative subjects at risk of negative repercussions as a result of military action. These issues run afoul of virtually all elements of the AAA's code of ethics. However, the program continues under varying reports of success. Michael Bhatia, a cultural anthropologist killed by an improvised explosive device while working on an HTT in Afghanistan reported to his colleagues that the commander of the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division credited his HTT with setting conditions for a 60% reduction in the use of kinetics.<sup>25</sup> Reports of other success generated by the teams vary from exposing individuals involved with the insurgency to tribal leaders who swear there is no local involvement<sup>26</sup> to discovering a group of impoverished widows whose children benefitted by a US jobs program established to create a source of income to decrease the need to find employment with insurgent organizations.<sup>27</sup> The value of HTS is definitely debatable from the perspective of return on investment as well as the risk to individuals as a result of the program. To date, three HTT social scientists have been killed in Afghanistan as they accompanied the military on operations that occurred after traditional, battlefield combat had subsided. The debate of the value of HTS as an MA<sub>2</sub> endeavor will undoubtedly continue, but anthropologists can realize as much effect through other programs.

MA<sub>1</sub> programs consist of anthropological study of the military. This type of program is the least controversial because it most closely follows all of the principles set forth in the AAA code of ethics. The purpose of MA<sub>1</sub> is to study and document the socio-cultural factors and behaviors of the various cultures in the military. The contribution of such an effort would be of great value, in particular because trends that have been documented by changes in doctrine alone

highlight the expanding roles the military will be expected to play in support of US strategy around the world. In the area of proficiency with cultural awareness, Allison Abbe and Stanley Halpin document that there are three components of cross-cultural competence that provide the capability to work in a foreign culture, knowledge, affect, and skills.<sup>28</sup> Knowledge is composed foremost of an understanding of one's own culture, and then expands out to expectations of differences and similarities among characteristics of other's culture. From this perspective, anthropologists can contribute to the military by studying its culture and educating members of the military about them. This has anecdotal significance, because as veterans of years of service can attest, the longer the military experience, the more alienating non-military civilization becomes. From this perspective, military members can learn a lot from professionals who tell them about the oddities of the culture they embrace. In some situations this knowledge may prevent an escalation of conflict.

If a military member can benefit from the knowledge shared by anthropologists engaged in MA<sub>1</sub> programs, the benefits of MA<sub>3</sub> programs must have even more significance. These programs describe anthropology for the military, albeit as educators at professional institutions, instructing on culture, language, and regional studies. The benefits of such instruction include further knowledge as described by Abbe and Halpin. Two other aspects of the equation remain however, and it is through education and study that the right dimensions of affect and skills can be developed. Affect is attitude toward foreign cultures and drive to learn about them, skills are individual traits to regulate behavior during interaction with foreign cultures.<sup>29</sup> Abbe and Halpin assert that of the three characteristics of cross-cultural competence, affect and skills were "most directly related to successful outcomes."<sup>30</sup> This determination was based off of research that also showed that such skills are culture-general and transferrable among situations. What they



describe is the right kind of attitude about foreign cultures, and contributes to the Marine Corps mantra of “every Marine an Information Officer.” Individual military members can be taught to be weary of culture, and be as respectful as each encounter allows. Being curious and observant underscores the strategic message behind MOOTW, stability, and counterinsurgency operations. Samir Shehata from the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies at Georgetown expressed how US insensitivities complicated the counterinsurgency effort in Iraq during testimony at congressional hearings in 2004, “every house raid turns a whole street against us; every wrongful detention, a neighborhood; every casualty, an extended family.”<sup>31</sup> At a minimum, broadcasting the appropriate message might to be enough to preclude the development of further hostilities to US military efforts. Exercising affect and skills in the right way demonstrates what some term as cultural competency.

Keith Brown used open source reports to document the changes in cultural education of the military between 2004 and 2007. He asserts that the change in education progressed from cultural awareness to cultural knowledge and understanding, and finally to achieving cultural competency.<sup>32</sup> The concept behind the effort at educating to build cross-cultural competency capitalizes on this approach to cultural education. Brian Selmeski defines cross-cultural competency as:

The ability to quickly and accurately comprehend, then appropriately and effectively engage individuals from distinct cultural backgrounds to achieve the desired effect.

- (1) Despite not having an in-depth knowledge of the other culture, and
- (2) Even though fundamental aspects of the other culture may contradict one’s own taken-for-granted assumptions/deeply-held beliefs.<sup>33</sup>



The objective of this competency is to minimize development of further hostilities to US strategic objectives. As Samir Shehata testified, cultural insensitivity tends to create more hostility. Cultural knowledge goes a long way towards achieving these ends by education to achieve the effect of cross-cultural competency. The end effect, therefore, of the overall MA<sub>1</sub> and MA<sub>3</sub> effort is to build a core of competency within the military. Culturally competent military members can act as appropriately as can be expected by societies that recognize them as foreigners, and ultimately accomplish their objectives without further escalating hostility to their cause. Anthropologists can use the strengths of their profession to aid the military in becoming a force that consistently uses minimum force to achieve strategic objectives set for the well-being of the United States.

### **Synthesis**

General David Petraeus emphasized the importance of cultural awareness as commander of Multi-National Force, Iraq when he said that “people are, in many respects, the decisive terrain.”<sup>34</sup> This statement epitomized the military perspective on recruiting assistance from the community of anthropologists as advisors and instructors to counterinsurgency. Their expertise would be used to minimize the creation of enemies who might inevitably compound the difficulty of the war effort. This effort recognizes that not only is it imperative to be culturally aware, but cultural awareness brings with it the ability to isolate the adversary and preclude his ability to negatively impact operations. Sheila Jager, an associate professor noted that “by failing to exploit the cultural distinctions and inherent tensions among our enemies, we have directly empowered them,”<sup>35</sup> and that “by letting them feel part of something bigger, we give them strength.”<sup>36</sup> As cultural awareness certainly could have resulted in a better operational

environment had the CPA not made the decisions to dissolve the centralizing agencies in Iraq, it also offers opportunities for isolating and minimizing the damage insurgency groups can cause.

The single unifying feature of all the lessons learned documented in this paper is the fact that they have been learned since the end of open conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq. The military usually terms the phases of war that follow the end of open conflict as phase IV and V, or stabilization and transition (to host nation forces) phases. Anthropologists' criticism of the HTS program is based on its ties to active military operations, and the value of the HTS program in the phases prior to conflict, or during open conflict, has yet to be determined. The benefit of cultural education provided by MA<sub>1</sub> and MA<sub>3</sub> efforts is that it has the potential to change the nature of conflict before it even begins. This sentiment is reflected by the latest movement among the administrators of the HTS program, Phase Zero. The idea is to utilize the strengths of the HTS system in areas where conflict hasn't occurred, to establish cultural knowledge before the military has to engage so as to preclude the necessity of violence to achieve strategic objectives.<sup>37</sup> The Phase Zero approach recognizes the power of backing up the employment of cultural awareness before phase IV and V, to before the conflict even begins.

To envision the power of cultural awareness employed before conflict begins, imagine MA<sub>1</sub> teams observing the way the military trains for conflict. They have the ability to highlight the aspects of military tactics that are most likely to cause cultural offense. The MA<sub>1</sub> teams could compare notes with MA<sub>3</sub> teams focused on regions to which the military unit is most likely to deploy next, who would then pass that knowledge on through education programs. Commanders could use that knowledge as required; either observing the maximum awareness to minimize offense to send a message, or intentionally ignoring it to send a message. In either case, the commander's awareness makes the tactics more potent. An armor officer and veteran of combat

in Iraq stated that “nothing prepared me for the fact that the most intimidating weapon in my arsenal was not the M1-A1 Abrams tank that I might drive up to someone’s house, but was instead the M-9 pistol I carried. The Iraqis had been conditioned by Saddam’s police that if an official came into your house with a pistol, no one was going to come out alive.”<sup>38</sup> Imagine the impact of that kind of knowledge, in this case, about the intimidation of an M9, might have had for commanders before they deployed and conducted their first house raid in search of information or insurgents in Iraq. A synthesis of the right kind of cultural expertise, of both the military and cultures where the military must work, can present opportunities for effective messaging and minimized conflict.

### **Conclusion**

The military has expanded its cultural awareness since 2000 through the use of anthropologists in ways that has improved its efficiency. Yet the most successful anthropological programs have proven to be those that are based on education before the military deploys. Analysis of military JIPOE doctrine since 2000 has demonstrated how the military has shaped its appreciation for socio-cultural factors in accordance with its expanding roles in MOOTW, stability and counterinsurgency operations. While the military has sought to expand its cultural knowledge, it has faced opposition from anthropologists who have codified their ethics based on scandals and ensuing discussions since before World War II. The ensuing code of ethics has influenced their willingness to participate in the military efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Finally, analysis of the various types of military anthropology programs has demonstrated the morality behind anthropologist’s involvement in military endeavors, and the value of their contributions. By realizing the strength of anthropological education, the military can train its members to be cross-culturally competent. This makes them more capable of creating military plans informed

by the perspectives they are likely to encounter, and of conducting operations that may just limit the formation of increasing hostility to strategic US efforts.



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- <sup>1</sup> This summary is derived from the appendix cited in Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor. *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*. (Pantheon Books: New York, NY, 2006), 551-590.
- <sup>2</sup> John Sawers. "From Special Rep for Iraq, Subject: Personal: Iraq: Progress Report" (25 June 2003) Sited in Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor. *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*. (Pantheon Books: New York, NY, 2006), 579.
- <sup>3</sup> The introduction is taken from Robb Fiechtner, "MidTerm for Tribe and Tradition" (Graduate paper, Air Command and Staff College, 2014), 1. The purpose of using this analysis is to show how big problems can result from cultural misunderstanding.
- <sup>4</sup> Joint Publication (JP) 2-01.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace*, 24 May 2000. V-6.
- <sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, V-6.
- <sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, V-7.
- <sup>7</sup> Joint Publication (JP) 2-01-03, *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment*, 16 June 2009. II-44.
- <sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, IV-2 through IV-7.
- <sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, IV-8.
- <sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, IV-11.
- <sup>11</sup> Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, 15 December 2006. Foreword.
- <sup>12</sup> David Cloud and Greg Jaffe, *The Fourth Star: Four Generals and Their Epic Struggle for the Future of the United States Army*. (Three Rivers Press: New York, NY, 2009), 216-220.
- <sup>13</sup> Joint Publication (JP) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, 5 October 2009. xxii-xxiii.
- <sup>14</sup> George R. Lucas, Jr, *Anthropologists in Arms: The Ethics of Military Anthropology*. (AltaMira Press: Plymouth, United Kingdom, 2009), 31-33.
- <sup>15</sup> James Peacock et al. *Commission on the Engagement of Anthropology with the US Security and Intelligence Communities*. (4 November 2007), 22. available at: [http://www.aaanet.org/pdf/upload/FINAL\\_Report\\_Complete.pdf](http://www.aaanet.org/pdf/upload/FINAL_Report_Complete.pdf) accessed on 7 April 2014
- <sup>16</sup> George R. Lucas, Jr, *Anthropologists in Arms: The Ethics of Military Anthropology*. (AltaMira Press: Plymouth, United Kingdom, 2009), 56.
- <sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 59.
- <sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 65.
- <sup>19</sup> Quoted from Berreman, 2003 in George R. Lucas, Jr, *Anthropologists in Arms: The Ethics of Military Anthropology*. (AltaMira Press: Plymouth, United Kingdom, 2009), 67.
- <sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 67.
- <sup>21</sup> AAA Ethics Blog, *Principles of Professional Responsibility*. Posted 1 November 2012, available at: <http://ethics.aaanet.org/ethics-statement-0-preamble/> accessed on 7 April 2014.
- <sup>22</sup> George R. Lucas, Jr, *Anthropologists in Arms: The Ethics of Military Anthropology*. (AltaMira Press: Plymouth, United Kingdom, 2009), 85.
- <sup>23</sup> ACSC, CS.
- <sup>24</sup> AAA Ethics Blog, *Anthropologists and the Human Terrain System*. Posted 25 April 2012, available at: <http://blog.aaanet.org/tag/aaa-code-of-ethics/> accessed on 8 April 2014.
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- <sup>26</sup> ACSC, CS.
- <sup>27</sup> Jim Hodges, "U.S. Army's Human Terrain Experts May Help Defuse Future Conflicts," in *Defense News*, (22 Mar 2012) available at: <http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120322/C4ISR02/303220015/> accessed on 8 April 2014
- <sup>28</sup> Allison Abbe and Stanley M. Halpin, "The Cultural Imperative for Professional Military Education and Leader Development," *Parameters* 39, no. 4 (2009), 24.
- <sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 25.
- <sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, 25.
- <sup>31</sup> Samir Shehata, quoted in Keith Brown, "'All They Understand is Force': Debating Culture in Operation Iraqi Freedom." *American Anthropologist*. 110, Issue 4. (2008), 445.
- <sup>32</sup> Wunderle, quoted in Keith Brown, "'All They Understand is Force': Debating Culture in Operation Iraqi Freedom." *American Anthropologist*. 110, Issue 4. (2008), 444.

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